Hazards of Living on the Edge of Water: The Case of Minnesota Point, Duluth, Minnesota by Rasid, Harun & Hufferd, James
Human Ecology, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1989 
Hazards of Living on the Edge of Water: 
The Case of Minnesota Point, Duluth, Minnesota 
Harun Rasid I and James Hufferd 2 
Based on a systematic sample survey among the residents of Minnesota Point, 
a fresh-water spit/baymouth bar on the southwest hore of Lake Superior, 
this study tests a number of hypotheses related to the perceived causes of 
lake level fluctuation and shore property hazards. The study found that, 
despite significant differences inproperty setting and the nature of flood and 
erosion hazards between the lakeside and the bayside of the spit, the majori- 
ty of the respondents perceived that their property hazards were induced 
primarily by the manipulation o flake levels by the International Joint Com- 
mission (1JC). Consequently, one in every two respondents wouM like to lower 
the lake level by amounts ranging from 30 cm to more than l m. The study 
points out the physical limitations of controlling water levels and recommends 
that greater attention shouM be given to shoreline management, which couM 
proivde guidelines for protecting existing coastal structures and for develop- 
ing minimum standards for future encroachment of the remaining unused 
sections of the shoreline. 
KEY WORDS: property hazards; building setback; shore protection measures; manipulation 
of lake levels; shoreline management. 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, industrial societies have viewed natural phenomena that 
impinge upon their lives as hazards to their well-being. The traditional 
response has been to try to eliminate the hazards with the technology athand 
(Rowntree, 1974). Thus, dams and levees have been built to control river 
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Fig. 1. A postulated relationship between lake level fluctuations and the magni- 
tude of property hazards on Minnesota Point. 
floods and groins and sea walls have been designed to protect water's edge 
from coastal erosion and flooding. One of the outcomes of this technologi- 
cal fix has been growing settlement of hazard-prone areas, with an implicit 
assumption by the occupants hat science and technology can readily be used 
to deal with every problem (Clawson, 1972). Consequently, it has become 
increasingly difficult for modern Western society, particularly for those liv- 
ing in a hazardous but otherwise attractive nvironment, to appreciate the 
fact that man cannot control all aspects of nature. They are so offended by 
the notion that phenomena such as high lake levels or large river floods due 
to unpredictably high levels of precipitation are beyond human control, that 
they must offer explanations blaming other humans for these undesirable 
outcomes. The popular misconception about he causes of recent high water 
levels in the Great Lakes is an example. According to this explanation, the 
regulation of lake levels by the International Joint Commission (IJC) is postu- 
lated as the main cause of lake level fluctuation and very little attention is
given to more important natural causes. Such an attitude ispervasive among 
the coastal residents on the Great Lakes who tend to absolve themselves of
any responsibility for occupying the hazardous edge of water by resorting 
to this type of explanation. The central objective of this paper is to test this 
hypothesis by using a case study on Minnesota Point, a low lying costal set- 
tlement on a spit, located on the southwest hore of Lake Superior, which 
is susceptible to coastal flooding and erosion hazards due to even minor fluc- 
tuations in lake levels (Fig. 1). Data from a questionnaire survey form the 
basis of testing this hypothesis and a number of other related assumptions. 
Alternative xplanations of the main causes of lake level fluctuation have 
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been reviewed and implications of this fluctuation for shoreline management 
are discussed at some length. 
ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING 
Minnesota Point, a 12-km log sandspit that separates Duluth Harbor 
and Superior Bay from the main water body of Lake Superior, is the ex- 
posed half of a continuous baymouth bar that extends from the shoreline 
of the City of Duluth to the south shore of Lake Superior in Wisconsin (Fig. 
2). The middle portion of the bar is submerged and separates Minnesota Point 
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Fig. 2. Location of Minnesota Point on the southwest shore of Lake Superior. The inset 
map (right) shows the geographical distribution of different types of property hazards dur- 
ing the 1985-1986 high water period. 
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from the second spit, Wisconsin Point. The geologic formation of this fresh- 
water baymouth bar is attributed primarily to littoral drift of sandy materi- 
als (mostly from the south shore) and secondarily to the outflow of the St. 
Louis and Nemadji Rivers (Loy, 1963). Two major engineering structures 
have been built through the bar. The Superior Entry concrete breakwaters 
were built in 1869. The Duluth Shipping Canal was excavated in 1871 and 
consists of two concrete piers/groins, 600-m long and 90-m wide (Corps of 
Engineers, 1976). 
The bulk of Minnesota Point is Composed of sandy materials, but the 
shoreline along the bayside has been modified considerably by artifical fill 
(dredged) materials. The bayside is protected from strong wave action by 
its restricted wind-wave fetches (less than 10 km). In contrast, the shoreline 
along the lakeside consists of natural beaches and dunes which are exposed 
to long fetches, ranging from 300-600 km. Winds from the northeasterly 
direction generate high waves along these fetches. Significant wave heights 
in open water may range between 5-6 m (Resio and Vincent, 1978). No such 
estimates are available for the bayside; but computations by the present 
authors, using wave charts and wind data, indicate wave heights of much 
lower magnitudes (only about 1/3 the size'of those on the lakeside). Although 
strong wave action along the lakeside may cause temporary loss of beach 
materials, on a long-term basis these beaches are characterized by equilibri- 
um profiles with slope angles ranging between 5-7 degrees (Loy, 1963; Corps 
of Engineers, 1976). Dune formations, ranging in elevation from 3-10 m, 
are sparsely vegetated and vulnerable to wave attacks during periods of high 
lake levels when the beaches are submerged. 
The levels of Lake Superior experience short-term (hourly), seasonal 
and long-term fluctuations. Spectaular changes in levels result from short- 
term oscillations of lake surfaces induced by wind set-up and seiche, which 
may raise or lower the lake level by up to 1 m within a period of a few hours 
(Hough, 1958). The low-lying coastal areas of the Minnesota Point are capable 
of absorbing the effects of such short-term oscillations during periods of nor- 
mal lake levels (at - 183.2 m). However, if such oscillations are superimposed 
on an additional rise of even one-third of a meter, significant flood and ero- 
sion hazards are experienced along the shoreline (Fig. 1). The seasonal re- 
gimes are more predictable; the lake normally fluctuates about 30 cm 
annually, being lowest before the snow melts in the spring and highest in 
September. 
In constrast to seasonal regimes, long-term fluctuations appear to have 
an irregular cycle. The 128-year lowest mean annual evel was recorded in 
1925-1926 at 182.9 m. Following that, at least three periods of high lake 
levels were experienced: in 1950-1951, 1972-1973, and 1985-1986 (Fig. 3). 
A second period of low levels occurred uring the 1960's, when major residen- 
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Fig. 3. Lake Superior water level and precipitation, 1920-1986. 
tial expansion took place on the Minnesota Point. The lake levels have been 
rising since 1960's, leading to record high water levels for 12 consecutive 
months in 1985-1986 (Fig. 3). Such high water levels are caused when inputs 
of precipitation, ground water, surface runoff, and streamflow exceed the 
outputs of evaporation and outflow from the lake. The lake levels are also 
dependent upon human regulation systems; the outflow is regulated through 
the Sault Ste. Marie locks by the International Joint Commission (IJC), 
whereas two diversion structures (The Ogoki River and Long Lac River) divert 
about 140 m3/s of steamflow from the Hudson Bay basin into Lake Superi- 
or (Yee and Cuthbert, 1985). Working under an agreement known as Plan 
1977, the IJC strives to keep Lake Superior's monthly mean level between 
182.38-183.48 m, while balancing water levels between Lake Superior and 
Lakes Michigan, Huron, and Erie. However, the lake's natural water balance 
overrides the effects of human regulation systems. For example, the 
1985-1986 high water levels resulted from a prolonged regime of above- 
normal precipitation, higher runoff, and lower evaporation (Quinn, 1987). 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
The first comprehensive damage survey on the Minnesota Point was 
carried out by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers immediately following the 
1972-1973 high water period (Corps of Engineers, 1976). Although this sur- 
vey provided estimates of relative proportions of residential and non- 
residential parcels of properties (as presented in Table I), the total number 
of houses were not reported. In a more recent submission to the U.S. House 
of Representatives, the City of Duluth estimated that there were 490 homes, 
apartments, and other institutions on Minnesota Point (Carson, 1987). The 
present authors counted 432 single- and double-family residential structures 
between the Duluth Shipping Canal and 42nd St. (Fig. 2). A systematic sam- 
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Table 1. Types of Properties on Minnesota Point, 1973-1974 a 
Types of ownership Parcels of ownerships 
Residential 
Non-residential 
Breakdown of non-residential properties 
City of Duluth 
(Park Point Recreation Center, 
Municipal airport, firehall, etc.) 
State of Minnesota 
Federal Government 
(U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Naval Station, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, etc.) 
ST. Louis County 
Unclassified 
197 (66%) 
103 (34~ 
39 
37 
15 
2 
10 
aSource: COE, 1976. 
pie was attempted by selecting every alternate household that had a visible 
address and a mailbox. The questionnaire was filled out at the site if a respon- 
dent was at home and agreed to an interview. If there was no one at home, 
a copy of the questionnaire was left in the mailbox with a request that it 
be filled out and returned by using the attached addressed and stamped enve- 
lope. In all, 250 households were visited. The response rate, expressed as 
the proportion of the total population, was approximately 40~ (175 respon- 
dents out of 432 households; with a confidence limit of ___ 6~ at p = 0.05). 
The geographical distribution of respondents was fairly representative of the 
subpopulations on the lakeside and the bayside. Thus, 94 responses on the 
lakeside and 81 on the bayside represent approximately 40070 of the popula- 
tions on each side (Table II). 
Table II. Property Setting a 
Lakeside Bayside 
Length of ownership, value, and setback 
Number of completed surveys 
Average length of property ownership 
(years) 
Average property value (U.S.$) 
Percent of properties exceeding a 
value of $60,000-$70,000 
Average building setback from the 
edge of water(m) 
94 81 
20 (N = 87) 17 
53,000 (N = 69) 51,000 
34 27 
74 (N  = 76) 
N b (0/0) ~ 
Distribution of building setback 
Less than 10 m 3 (3.9) 
10-33 m 5 (6.6) 
More than 33 m 68 (89.5) 
(N = 73) 
(N = 51) 
33 (N = 52) 
N (%) 
19 (36.5) 
23 (44.2) 
10 (19.2) 
aChi-square = 64.00, df = 2, significant at 0.001 level. 
bN = number of respondents. 
(0/o) = Percent of respondents who reported property setback. 
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Residential development on the Minnesota Point was initiated at the 
turn of this century. The longest period of property ownership reported in 
this survey is 72 years. However, less than one-third of the properties (3007o) 
were owned for 25 years or longer and more than one-half of (5207o) were 
acquired uring the last 15 years, i.e., following the 1972-1973 high water 
period. Such short-term ownerships probably indicate recent constructions 
as well as large turnover of hazard-prone properties and imply that more 
than one-half of the respondents experienced high lake levels in 1985-1986 
for their first time. The length of ownership is shorter and property values 
are lower on the bayside than on the lakeside (Table II). Not only are the 
more expensive homes located on the lakeside, but most of the properties 
on this side are also situated On higher grounds with wider building setback. 
The height of the base of buildings on this side ranges between 2-3 m above 
the lake level, whereas on the bayside most Of the buildings are situated with- 
in an elevation of 1-1.5 m above the water level. 
The impact of high lake levels on a specific property is governed by 
a combination of two basic variables: building setback and elevation. Since 
the range of elevation is relatively small (1-3m), the variation in building 
setback is the principal determinant of property hazards. The building set- 
back for approximately 90~ of the properties on the lakeside xceeds 33 
m, whereas on the bayside the setback is less than this value for about 81 070 
of the properties. At least one-third of the buildings on the bayside (36070) 
are located within 10 m of the edge of water. The difference of  means tests 
as well as the chi-square tests indicate that these differences in setback are 
significantly related to the location of properties on either the lakeside or 
the bayside (Table II). Further cross-tabulations of data on setback with the 
frequency of flood and erosion damages also indicate a significant relation- 
ship between location and property hazards. Thus, about hree-quarters of 
the properties on the bayside (71.6%), all of which had a setback of less than 
33 m, experienced flood and erosion damages during the 1985-1986 high water 
period. On the lakeside only 40% of the properties reported such damages 
(Tables III and IV). 
FLOOD DAMAGE AND EROSION MAGNITUDE 
No attempt was made to estimate the cost of flood damage. Property 
owners were asked to report on the nature of flood damage. Two types of 
flood damage were reported: (1) flooding of basements due to a rise inthe 
water table, and (2) direct inundation of yards and outbuildings, uch as 
garages and storage sheds, mostly during storm wave conditions. More than 
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Table IIL Nature of Flood Damage During the 1985-1986 High Water Period 
Lakeside Bayside 
(%)" N (%) 
No flood damage 55 (58.5) 23 (28.4) 
Basements, yards, and outbuildings flooded 30 (31.9) 45 (55.6) 
Yards and outbuildings flooded 
(excluding basements) 9 (9.6) 13 (16) 
aChi-square = 15.97, df = 2, significant at 0.001 level. 
bN = number of respondents. 
c(%) = Percent of sample on each side. 
three-quarters of the respondents on each side of the spit who reported flood 
damage indicated that they experienced both of these types of floods simul- 
taneously. The remaining one-quarter experienced only inundation of yards 
and outbuildings (Table III). Thus, there was no significant difference be- 
tween the lakeside and the bayside in the relative proportions of two types 
of flood damage. However, the overall frequency of flood damage was 
1.6-1.7 times higher on the bayside than on the lakeside. The chi-square tests 
of association between location and the frequency of flood damage indicate 
that these relationships are significant at 0.001 level (Table III). Lower ele- 
vation and limited property setback are the two main causes of higher fre- 
quency of flooding on this side. 
There are no published ata on erosion rates for Minnesota Point. The 
Natural Resources Research Institute of the University of Minnesota-Duluth 
has recently initiated a coastal erosion measurement program for the Min- 
nesota shore of Lake Superior by using historical aerial photographs and 
ground reconnaissance survey (Johnston, personal communication). Min- 
nesota Point is included in this program, but erosion rates have not yet been 
determined. In the absence of actual data, property owners were asked to 
estimate rosion rates. The magnitude of the erosion problem is reflected 
in the estimated erosion rates on the lakeside and in the frequency of ero- 
sion on the bayside (Table IV). Average long-term erosion rates as well as 
the 1985-1986 rates were approximately 3-5 times higher on the lakeside than 
on the bayside. This can be attributed principally to the effect of the exposure 
of this side to long wind-wave fetches. The average long-term erosion rates 
were calculated by dividing the total amount of erosion (since property owned) 
by the average length of property ownership. These rates appear to be sig- 
nificantly lower than the 1985-1986 rates. There are at least two probable 
explanations for this. First, the 1985-1986 rates were probably higher than 
the previous rates due to the above-average duration of high lake levels. Se- 
cond, people's perception of a hazard tends to be magnified with the recen- 
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Lakeside Bayside 
Estimated erosion rates 
Estimated total amount  of  erosion since 
property owned (m) 
Average long-term erosion rates (m/y) 
Average 1985-1986 erosion rates 
(m/y) 
10.4 (N = 16) 2.2 (N = 25) 
0.52 (N = 16) 0.13 (N = 25) 
3.14 (N= 16) 1.1 (N= 30) 
N b (~ c N (~ 
Magnitude of 1985-1986 erosion estimates 
No erosion 57 (60.6) 23 (28.4) 
Less than 1 m 2 (2.1) 20 (24.7) 
More than 1 m 14 (14.9) 10 (12.3) 
Erosion rates not specified 21 (22.3) 28 (34.6) 
aChi-square = 21.46, df = 3, significant at 0.001 level. 
bN = number of respondents. 
c(%) = Percent of  sample on each side. 
cy of the event (White, 1974). According to this hypothesis, it is probable 
that the long-term rates were underestimated and the most recent rates were 
exaggerated. Since it would be difficult o verify the accuracy of such data, 
the magnitude of recent erosion was further analyzed by using the ranges 
of erosion rates to examine if there was any pattern in the nature of erosion 
estimates on the lakeside and the bayside. These data, indeed, confirm the 
lakeside-bayside dichotomy; while a larger number of respondents reported 
erosion rates of more than 1 m/yr on the lakeside, the frequency of overall 
erosion is about 1.8 times higher on the bayside. The chi-square tests indi- 
cate that these associations between location and the frequency of erosion 
are significant at 0.001 level (Table IV, bottom). Lower erosion rates on the 
bayside reflect he effects of restricted fetches and sheltered wave climates, 
while higher frequencies of erosion may be attributed to the physical setting 
of the properties (lower elevation and limited setback) that make them high- 
ly vulnerable to erosion. Also, awareness of the erosion problem might have 
been higher on this side due to the location of a large number of homes near 
the edge of water. 
The lakeside-bayside ichotomy can be further examined through the 
geographical distribution of the nature of hazards. Although three types of 
hazards are illustrated in Fig. 2, the dominant problem on the lakeside is 
dune and beach erosion (Between 19th and 42nd Streets), whereas on the 
bayside the combined effects of shoreline rosion and basement flooding 
predominate (between 19th and 38th Streets). 
94 Rasid and Hufferd 
ADJUSTMENTS TO HAZARDS 
Protection Measures 
Since all of the properties urveyed are privately owned, property owners 
have had to fend for themselves. Confronted with property hazards due to 
high lake levels, coastal flooding, and erosion, typical responses of property 
owners ranged from "doing nothing" (loss bearing) to installing a variety of 
structural devices for combating flood and erosion problems. Despite the 
seriousness of the hazards, only about one-third to one-half of the respon- 
dents reported some types of protection measures. The sump pump, used 
to protect against basement flooding, was the most popular flood-protection 
device; yet, only one-third of the respondents, on either side of the spit, used 
one (Table V). Only two respondents on each side had flood insurance on 
their properties. Many respondents suggested uring personal interviews that 
the premium for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was too high. 
Others thought that the NFIP insurance was not available without the in- 
corporation of a certain amount of flood-proofing in the original construc- 
tion of the buildings. 
A greater variety and number of structural measures were used for the 
protection of properties from erosion. Retaining walls (seawalls), riprap, and 
Table V. Adjustments to Hazards 
Lakeside Bayside 
N ~ (O/o)b N (%) 
Adjustments to floods 
No adjustment 48 (64) 32 (59.3) 
Use of sump pump 25 (33.3) 20 (37) 
Property covered by National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) 2 (2.7) 2 (3.7) 
Adjustments to erosion 
Shore protection structures, 
(including multiple responses) 
Retaining walls l 1 
Riprap 1 
Sand and gravel fill 6 
Others 12 
Totals 30 
Average cost of shore protection per 
property (U.S.$) 1033 
Cost of shore protection as a percent of 
property value 1.9 
18 
29 
14 
2 
52 
2365 
4.5 
aN = number of respondents. 
b(~ = Percent of those who responded to this question. 
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fill materials (sand and gravel) were the most favored measures. Not a single 
groin was reported from either side of the spit. Other measures mentioned 
included planting vegetation and building fences, particularly on the lake- 
side, for stabilizing and protecting dunes. The larger number of shore pro- 
tection structures on the bayside indicate not only the higher density of 
low-lying coastal properties but also a longer life of structures in its low- 
energy wave climate. Due to the severity of wave climate facing the lakeside, 
many of the coastal structures, inparticular, wooden retaining walls and sand 
fences, are destroyed within a relatively short span of time unless they are 
constantly maintained and occasionally replaced. In general, most of the 
coastal structures on both sides of the spit are superficial in nature. This is 
reflected in the relatively small amount of investment made by individual 
property owners for shore protection measures (1.9-4.5% of the property 
value, as reported in Table V). 
Responsibi l it ies for Shore Protection 
One of the central issues related to property hazards on Minnesota Point 
is concerned with the justification for living so close to the edge of water. 
Living in a hazardous environment can be justified only if that environment 
is considered as a resource outweighing the risk (White, 1974). Probably most 
of the residents of Minnesota Point were attracted to the spit by the ameni- 
ties of its shoreline. Erosion and flood damage on the shoreline should, there- 
fore, be considered as an inherent operating cost of living in the coastal 
envrironment. To assess if property owners agreed with this proposition, they 
were asked "who should be responsible for shore protection measures?" Not 
only were they divided in their opinion, but more than one-half of them 
blamed the IJC and the Federal Government for raising the lake levels. That, 
in their opinion, was the primary cause of property hazards. More than three- 
quarters of the respondents a serted that either the IJC alone or a combina- 
tion of various levels of governments (Federal, State and Municipal) should 
be responsible for shore protection measures. Very few respondents (less than 
8~ agreed to bear full responsibilities, while less than 18% would settle for 
sharing responsibilities with the various levels of governments (Table VI, top). 
Because of the considerable contrasts in the nature of property hazards be- 
tween the lakeside and the bayside, significant differences in the perception 
of hazard responsibilities were expected between the respondents of the op- 
posite sides of the spit. The results of the survey do not support his expecta- 
tion, as there was no significant lakeside-bayside dichotomy in respondents' 
assertions. Perhaps the common denominator fhigh levels and the percep- 
tion that these levels were controlled principally by the IJC served as a per- 
vasive theme throughout the entire spit. 
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Table Vl. Adjustment Policies 
Lakeside Bayside 
N" (%)b N (%) 
Who should be responsible for 
shore protection? c 
Federal Government (IJC) only 45 (53) 41 (51.2) 
Combination of various levels of govern- 
ments(Federal, State, Municipal) 20 (23.5) 22 (27.5) 
Property owners only 5 (5.9) 6 (7.5) 
Combination of property owners and dif- 
ferent levels of government 15 (17.6) ll (13.8) 
Lower the lake level d
Less than 30 cm 23 (39.1) 18 (41.8) 
30cm-I m 27 (40.9) 20 (46.5) 
More than 1 m 7 (10.6) 3 (6.9) 
Don't know 9 (13.6) 2 (4.6) 
Political attention on high lake levels e
Spoken/written to someone in govern- 
ment (Federal, State, Municipal) 35 (71.4) 32 (71.1) 
Taken other steps 7 (14.3) 9 (20) 
Did nothing 7 (14.3) 4 (8.9) 
~ = number of respondents. 
b(%) = Percent of those who responded to this question. 
cChi-square = 0.858, df = 3, not significant at 0.05 level. 
dChi-square = 2.83, df = 3, not significant at 0.05 level. 
eChi-square = 1.074, df = 2, not significant at 0.05 level. 
Manipulating Lake Levels 
To test the hypothesis that the residents o f  Minnesota Point believed 
that the levels o f  Lake Superior were primarily dependent upon the I JC con- 
trol, property owners were asked to give their opinion about the amount  by 
which Lake Superior should be lowered f rom the 1985-1986 levels. Among 
those who responded to this question, only about 40~ wanted to maintain 
the long-term normal level by lowering it less than 30 cm; while more than 
50070 overestimated the need for lowering by suggesting amounts ranging be- 
tween 30 cm and over 1 m. Obviously, these respondents were not concerned 
about other Great Lakes interests, such as power production, shipping, boat 
launching, and marinas, that would be adversely affected by such lowering. 
Again, the pervasiveness of  this theme is evident from the lack o f  any sig- 
nificant differences in responses between the lakeside and the bayside (Ta- 
ble VI, middle). 
Technically, it is possible to further reduce fluctuations in Lake Su- 
perior levels by controll ing the release of  water f rom the Sault Ste. Marie 
locks and by manipulating the Ogoki-Long Lac diversions. However,  the 
former would require expensive xcavation of  the outlet channels to increase 
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their capacities when supplies are high, and the construction ofcontrol struc- 
tures to reduce outflows when supplies are low (EC/OMNR, 1975). To sup- 
plement the effects of regulatory works at Sault Ste. Marie, the IJC recently 
investigated the potential of using the Ogoki-Long Lac diversion (inflows) 
as a means of regulating the levels of Lake Superior (IJC, 1988). An earlier 
investigation i dicated that it would be possible to lower the levels of Lake 
Superior by only 10 cm over a period of 10 years, even if the entire inflow 
was shut off (Yee and Cuthbert, 1985). Such reductions would not be sig- 
nificant for the low-lying coasts of Minnesota Point, because the short-term 
oscillations of lake levels that accompany damaging storms exceed this range. 
Polit ical Attention on High Lake Levels 
The residents of Minnesota Point cannot be blamed alone for their views 
on the role of the IJC. During the 1985-1986 high water period, various 
government agencies, including the State of Minnesota, St. Louis County, 
and the City of Duluth, made formal submissions to the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Subcommittee onWater Resources) implying that the IJC 
was responsible for the record high water levels in Lake Superior (Carson, 
1987; Thorne, 1987). The main concern of these submissions centered around 
the IJC operation plan 1977, according to which Lake Superior was used 
as a storage reservoir to balance levels in other Great Lakes. It was pointed 
out that, prior to the adoption of this plan, Lake Superior was regulated 
according to its own level without reference to the lower lakes (Thorne, 1987). 
These views were well-publicized through the media, resulting in high degrees 
of awareness of the issue among the entire population of Minnesota Point. 
This might, in turn, have motivated property owners to press for further po- 
litical action for lowering the lake levels, reinforcing the official position on 
this issue. To test this hypothesis, property owners were asked "what steps 
have you taken to bring the problem of high lake levels to the attention of 
politicians or government agencies?" Among those who responded to this 
question, a large number (71~ had spoken or written to someone in the 
government on this issue. Other steps taken by about 14-20% included at- 
tending community meetings on this issue or consultations with friends and 
neighbors. Again, there was no significant difference between the lakeside 
and the bayside in political attention on the issue of high lake levels (Table 
VI bottom). 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
It appears from the foregoing discussions that political attention has 
been focused on the wrong issue, i.e., on human-induced regulation of lake 
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levels. In reality, the levels of Lake Superior and of other Great Lakes are 
primarily dependent upon climatic cycles. Existing regulatory structures on 
Lake Superior are capable of manipulating only small changes in levels. Sig- 
nificant manipulations would require major expansion of regulatory struc- 
tures, the cost of which would outweigh the benefit derived from such 
installations. Since human ability to regulate lake levels is limited, greater 
attention should be given to measures that may be employed by governments 
to reduce hazard losses. Shoreline management represents such a measure 
for coping with the hazards of fluctuating lake levels. 
The central philosophy of a comprehensive shoreline management plan 
is to protect existing development and to prevent future encroachment of
high-risk reaches of the shoreline. On Minnesota Point, where a large num- 
ber of coastal properties have already been developed, "shoreline manage- 
ment can guide decisions concerning effective and environmentally compatible 
shore protection methods" (Kreutzwiser, 1987). Most of the existing coastal 
structures on this spit, such as jetties and wooden retaining walls, were 
designed according to the normal ake levels without considerations for the 
impact of high lake levels. A comprehensive shoreline management plan 
would recognize that certain amounts of lake level fluctuations were inevita- 
ble, and therefore, a number of building codes would be incorporated into 
the original designs of coastal structures to cope with the effects of high lake 
levels. For example, buildings with flood-proofing and with setbacks, based 
on certain standards such as the 100-year lake level, might be aceptable for 
Minnesota Point where many low-lying properties are liable to flooding. 
The main thrust of a shoreline management plan lies in its prevention 
component. Of all the prevention measures, perhaps the greatest potential 
for reducing shoreline damage lies in the implementation f land-use regula- 
tions. By prohibiting property development, local planning agencies can ef- 
fectively control encroachment on hazard-prone reaches. Obversely, if 
permission is given to build on such reaches, these agencies cannot be ab- 
solved of their responsibilities. One of the objectives of the recently-formed 
Minnesota North Shore Management Board is to establish shoreline manage- 
ment standards, which would be used for monitoring future encroachment 
of all coastal areas in Minnesota, including those of Minnesota Point. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examined a number of hypotheses related to the recent 
(1985-1986) high water levels in Lake Superior and the resulting property 
hazards along the shorelines of Minnesota Point, Duluth. The study con- 
firmed the central hypothesis that the majority of the residents of Minneso- 
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ta Point perceived human regulation systems, i.e., the regulation of lake levels 
by the IJC, to be the main cause of high lake levels and shore property haz- 
ards. An alternative hypothesis, that the perception of the causes of property 
hazards as well as the attitude toward the responsibility for shore protection 
measures were conditioned by the nature of property hazards experienced 
by individual property owners, was rejected by the results of the question- 
naire survey. Despite significant differences in property setting and the na- 
ture of hazards between the lakeside and the bayside of the spit, the study 
indicated that there was no significant relationship between the location of 
properties and the respondents' perception of the underlying causes of their 
property hazards. 
To cope with flood and erosion hazards, many property owners have 
made use of a range of protection measures, but most of them perceived 
lower lake levels as a higher priority than providing shore protection meas- 
ures. Such a perception implied that lake levels were primarily dependent 
upon human regulation systems. Consequently, very few respondents would 
like to bear full responsibility for shore protection measures, despite the fact 
that they had made the choice to live on the hazardous edge of water. The 
most direct evidence in support of the central hypothesis was provided by 
the political attention on high lake levels. During the 1985-1986 high water 
period property owners as well as their political representatives started lob- 
bying the Federal Government to apply pressure on the IJC to lower lake 
levels. In most of these political submissions, a number of IJC flow regula- 
tion plans were critized without analysis of the physical constraints of these 
plans. The present study reviewed the physical limitations of controlling water 
levels and recommended that a more productive approach would be to fo- 
cus political attention on shoreline management, which could provide sound 
guidelines for protecting existing properties and for preventing future en- 
croachment on the remaining unused reaches of the shorelines of Minnesota 
Point. 
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